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This document specifies the standard data concepts that comprise the "Minimum Set of Data" (MSD) to be transferred from a vehicle to a 'Public Safety Answering Point' (PSAP) in the event of a crash or emergency via an 'eCall' communication transaction. Optional additional data concepts may also be transferred. The communications media protocols and methods for the transmission of the eCall message are not specified in this document.

This document defines an additional data concept that may be transferred as an ‘optional additional data concept’ as defined in EN 15722 eCall MSD, that may be transferred from a vehicle to a PSAP in the event of a crash or emergency via an eCall communication session. The purpose of this document is simply to enable the existing MSD to house multiple OADs. This is achieved by providing a short optional additional data concept, which facilitates the inclusion of multiple additional datasets within the currently defined MSD of 140 bytes (Every OAD still requires its own specification). This document can be seen as an addendum to EN 15722; it contains as little redundancy as possible. NOTE 1 The communications media protocols and methods for the transmission of the eCall message are not specified in this document. NOTE 2 Additional data concepts can also be transferred, and it is advised to register any such data concepts using a data registry as defined in EN ISO 24978. See www.esafetydata.com for an example.

This document shall be considered as a complementary standard to EN 16803-2 that is intended to assessment of the performances of a GBPT placed in real-life or simulated road environments. This document is instead specifically targeting security attacks such as interferences, jamming, meaconing or spoofing. This document cannot be applied independently from EN 16803-2 that describes in details the general methodology of the assessment procedure. This document provides normative information necessary to replay in the lab standardized scenarios specifically dedicated to security tests applied to GNSS. Depending on the case (jamming or spoofing), these scenarios are composed of data sets combining either real life recorded SIS and jamming signals or simulated SIS and spoofing signals. The reason for that will be explained in Clause 6. Although a high-level categorization of GNSS attacks is given in Annex A, a comprehensive and detailed categorization of possible GNSS attacks is out of the scope of this document. It is not the aim of this EN to standardize the record procedure neither to define the specific requirements for the generation of the attack scenarios. The record procedure itself and its quality framework for accredited GNSS-specialized laboratories (Lab-A), with the detailed definition of standardized attack scenarios, will be totally and precisely described in EN 16803-4 (under preparation). The list of attack scenarios will have to be regularly updated considering the evolution of GNSS technologies, emerging threats, and countermeasures.